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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Mr. Severson’s Third Amended Verified
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on Remand.
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Severson set out why the district court erred in its various
conclusions and, ultimately, why it erred in dismissing Mr. Severson’s Third Amended Verified
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on Remand (“Petition”). Mr. Severson provided both argument
and authority for why the district court erred in dismissing the Petition, both as it concerned the
claims against trial counsel and those related to appellate counsel.
The State asserts the district court was correct in its dismissal of the Petition because, in its
view, Mr. Severson failed to demonstrate trial counsel was objectively deficient and Mr. Severson
failed to demonstrate prejudice as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and
State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300, 986 P.2d 323 (1999). It goes further, however, and posits a
“right result/wrong reason” argument for supporting the district court’s dismissal because, in the
State’s view, the district court erroneously concluded that statements by the prosecutor amounted
to misconduct. The State also argues, for the first time on appeal, that any allegations of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel are barred because such claims were, somehow, outside the scope
of the Court’s remand in Severson v. State, 159 Idaho 517, 363 P.3d 358 (2015) (Severson II).
Finally, the State contends the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Severson’s claims of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel warranted dismissal, even if within the purview of the district court
on remand.
For the reasons set forth in Mr. Severson’s Opening Brief, as well as those set forth below,
the State is wrong for several reasons. At the end of the day, the district court erred in dismissing
Mr. Severson’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against both trial and appellate counsel.
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B. The District Court Correctly Concluded Five Statements By the Prosecutor
Constituted Misconduct, But Erred In Concluding Those Statements Did Not
Constitute Fundamental Error.
The State argues the district court erred in finding the following statements constituted
prosecutorial misconduct:
“All we know is that according to Dr. Dawson, the State’s expert in this case – I
think a very credible individual, with nothing to lose in this matter – gave you a
good answer as to how he figured out the totals [number of pills ingested by Mary].”
“Please don’t hold that fact, that Mr. Howen may have said she [Mr. Severson’s
girlfriend Jennifer] was nineteen instead of the ripe old age of 21. Or, she still looks
like she is about 19.”
“And I guess all the witnesses say that they saw Larry running around with a girl
they thought was his daughter, who was a teenager, who was all of age 18 or 19.
That may have been playing in his [the other prosecutor’s] mind.”
“There is no innocence in this courtroom except the innocence of Mary Severson.
She did not have to die.”
“The only reason she did [die] was the lust and greed of the defendant to get out of
a marriage rather than divorce so he could get all the money and then some; and he
could pursue his other women, not this fat woman that he saw in front of him who
refused to give him a divorce.”
Respondent’s Brief, pp. 8-10.
It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing
but competent evidence is submitted to the jury.” State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho
463, 469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2007) (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44, 71 P.
608, 611 (1903)). Prosecutors, therefore, should not “exert their skill and ingenuity
to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so
doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused.” Id. Prosecutorial misconduct
occurs “[w]here [the] prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other
than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during
trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence[.]
State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 494, 399 P.3d 804, 821 (2017).
Here, the district court properly concluded the aforementioned statements constituted
prosecutorial misconduct. R. 45780-2018. Vol.4, p. 851 (“[t]he Court finds the prosecutor’s
statement was improper and constituted error”); p. 854 (“the Court finds the statement[s] … were
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improper as they serve no purpose but to enflame the passion and prejudice of the jury”); p. 854
(the Court incorporates its previous findings finding statement was made to enflame the passion
and prejudice of the jury); p. 857 (“Because the comment on Mary’s innocence was improper, the
Court finds the statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.”); and p. 858 (“the form of the
prosecutor’s argument undoubtedly enflamed the passion and prejudice of the jury.”). As argued
in the Opening Brief, however, the district court erred in its conclusion that each of the five
statements did not amount to fundamental error.
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument will be considered a fundamental error when
it is “calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or prejudice against the
defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors
outside the evidence.” State v. Ortiz, 148 Idaho 38, 42, 218 P.3d 17, 21 (Ct. App. 2009) citing
State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997) and State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710,
715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 (Ct. App. 2003).
Objectionable statements made during closing argument pose a special risk because they
are some of the last things jurors hear before retiring to deliberate. Zapata v. Vasquez, 788 F.3d
1106, 1116 (9th Cir. 2015). “The presentation of improper material at the end of trial magnifies its
prejudicial effect because it is freshest in the mind of the jury when it retires to deliberate.” Id. at
1122; see also State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 42, 71 P. 608, 610 (1903).
Here, the district court seemed to ignore the timing of the prosecutorial misconduct in its
analysis of whether there was fundamental error. Where a prosecutor engages in a “relentless and
blatant abuse of power,” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 732, 215 P.3d 414, 443 (2009)
(Severson I) (Jones, W., J. dissenting), for “the sole purpose of appealing to the passions of the
jury,” id., 215 P.3d at 443 (Jones, W., J. dissenting), fundamental error must be found. If not, it is
difficult to imagine what blatant acts of prosecutorial misconduct would.
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Further, the district court mistakenly concluded some of these improper statements were
cured by the trial court’s jury instructions. R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, p. 851. In close cases, such as
Mr. Severson’s, standard jury instructions are not always sufficient to cure a prosecutor’s
misconduct. See United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 575 (9th Cir. 2004). In fact, even where a
timely objection is made, a “quick statement that ‘the jury will disregard’” the prosecutor’s
comment is oftentimes insufficient to cure improper vouching. United States v. Alcantara-Castillo,
788 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). The district court erred and should be reversed.
C. The State’s Contention That Mr. Severson “Failed To Present Evidence Of Any
Objective Shortcomings By Counsel” Fails.
The State asserts, regardless of the numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct the
district court found in the State’s closing argument, Mr. Severson failed to present evidence that
the failure to object was unreasonable. The State relies on the presumption that objecting to a
prosecutor’s closing argument is “a strategic decision,” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 826, 419 P.3d
1042, 1124 (2018); State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 566 n.8, 199 P.3d 123, 141 n.8 (2008) and
argues “there was no evidence presented indicating that any lack of objection to any of the
statements not addressed on the first appeal was the result of objective shortcoming[s].”
Respondent’s Brief, p. 11. The State’s argument ignores several, salient facts: (1) the district court
found trial counsel was, indeed, “deficient for failing to object to the accumulated inflammatory
statements,” R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, p. 864; and (2) the sheer number of instances of prosecutorial
misconduct in closing argument.
In Severson I, the dissent found “the prosecutor’s conduct relentless and a blatant abuse of
power.” Severson I at 723, 215 P.3d at 443 (Jones, W., J. dissenting). Justice W. Jones found this
even in the absence of a challenge to the statements the trial court here found to be prosecutorial
misconduct. The State continues to recognize the case against Mr. Severson was “circumstantial.”
Respondent’s Brief, p. 10. The State ignores the circumstantial nature of the case against Mr.
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Severson when it is inconvenient for it to do otherwise. It also pays little attention to the timing of
the State’s blatant misconduct. There is no objective reason for trial counsel to have not objected
to the “relentless and blatant abuse of power.”
D. The State’s Argument That Mr. Severson “Failed To “Show Prejudice” Is Incorrect.
The State contends Mr. Severson’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel fail
because he failed to satisfy the second Strickland prong – prejudice. Respondent’s Brief, pp. 1416. The State seems to focus solely on whether the outcome of Mr. Severson’s trial would have
been different. The State’s argument misses the mark.
First, “an analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to
whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.”
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993). The State would have this Court require Mr.
Severson prove the outcome of his trial would have been different. That is not the test to be
applied. Instead, given the “relentless and blatant abuse of power” by the prosecutor during closing
argument, the test identified in Lockhart is satisfied here. Mr. Severson’s trial was rendered
fundamentally unfair because of the prosecutor’s misconduct during closing argument. Therefore,
Mr. Severson was prejudiced.
E. The State Contends The Cumulative Error Doctrine Does Not Apply To Trial Courts;
The Doctrine, However, Can, At A Minimum, Be Applied In The Post-Conviction
Context To Determine Whether A Defendant’s Criminal Trial Was Fundamentally
Fair.
The State argues Mr. Severson “has failed to show how that appellate standard [for
cumulative error] could, or should have, been invoked by trial counsel. Respondent’s Brief, p. 17.
The State misses the point.
The district court determined that, because it did not find any fundamental error, the
cumulative error doctrine did not afford Mr. Severson any relief. R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, pp. 86364.
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Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. However, a
necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one
error.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho, 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010) (internal citations omitted). In order
for unobjected-to errors to be considered under the cumulative error doctrine, they need to satisfy
the fundamental error doctrine. Id., 245 P.3d at 982. Notably, the district court did not conclude
the cumulative error claim was not properly before it.
A district court considering a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
can, and should, utilize the cumulative error doctrine. First, the district court is essentially sitting
in an “appellate” capacity vis-à-vis trial counsel’s actions. Second, applying the cumulative error
analysis assists in determining whether the Lockhart standard of fundamental fairness and
reliability has been satisfied. For example, the failure of trial counsel to object to a single instance
of prosecutorial misconduct may, or, given the gravity of the misconduct, may not, result a trial
that is fundamentally unfair. The more instances of un-objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, the
more likely it is that the trial is fundamentally unfair. This is common sense.
F. The State’s Argument That The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider Mr.
Severson’s Claims Of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Should Be Rejected
Out-Of-Hand.
The State argues for the first time on appeal the district court lacked “jurisdiction to
consider new claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel” when the case was remanded
following the decision in Severson II. The State relies on the holding of State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho
883, 11 P.3d 1101 (2000), wherein the Court reiterated the general rule that “on remand, a trial
court has authority to take actions it is specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary
to the actions directed by the appellate court.” 134 Idaho at 886, 11 P.3d at 1104 citing Walters v.
Indust. Indem.Co., 130 Idaho 836, 838, 949 P.2d 223, 225 (1997). The State’s argument fails.
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Initially, it must be noted: The State is forced argue the timeliness of the claims of
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel not based on the timelines set forth in the Uniform PostConviction Procedure Act itself but, instead, based on the strained logic of its current
“jurisdictional” argument. This is so for two reasons. First, the timelines set forth in the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act have been deemed to not be jurisdictional. See Anderson v. State,
133 Idaho 788, 796-97, 992 P.2d 783, 791-92 (Ct. App. 1999); Hoffman v. State, 124 Idaho 281,
282, 858 P.2d 820, 821 (Ct. App. 1993). Second, because the State did not argue the timeliness of
the issues concerning ineffective assistance of counsel before the district court, this Court will not
consider that argument on appeal. Anderson, 133 Idaho at 792, 992 P.2d at 792.
Thus, the State is left to argue the issues of appellate ineffective assistance of counsel fell
outside the Severson II Court’s specific directions to the district court on remand or were subsidiary
to those actions. Hosey, 134 Idaho at 886, 11 P.3d at 1104. Even here, though, the State’s argument
misses the mark. Indeed, the State ignores the plain language of the Severson II Court’s direction
to the district court on remand.
In Severson II, the Court stated its decision to remand the matter to the district court “gives
the district court the opportunity to address any claims Severson may present regarding appellate
counsel’s failure to raise on direct appeal those statements which the dissent [Severson I] noted
but which the majority did not address.” Severson II, 159 Idaho at 522, 363 P.3d at 363. Mr.
Severson did so. Therefore, the State’s argument that the district court was without jurisdiction to
entertain Mr. Severson’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fails.
G. The State’s Contention That Mr. Severson Failed To Demonstrate Prejudice For His
Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel Fails.
The State argues that Mr. Severson failed to demonstrate prejudice as a result of appellate
counsel’s deficient performance. The State’s contention collapses under any reasonable analysis.
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As argued in Mr. Severson’s Opening Brief, the district court found “appellate counsel was
deficient” for failing to raise, on appeal, three of the statements the district court concluded
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, p.867. The district court erred,
however, in concluding those statements did not amount to fundamental error. The State does not
even take the opportunity to argue in the alternative, meaning that if the statements do constitute
fundamental error, then Mr. Severson was prejudiced by the failure to raise them on appeal.
Additionally, the State contends appellate counsel’s deficient performance in failing to cite
argument or authority in support of an appellate argument should, for all intents and purposes, be
ignored because prejudice was not shown.
The district court correctly concluded appellate counsel’s performance was deficient for
failing to support, with argument or authority, the argument that the following statement amounted
to prosecutorial misconduct:
“We are done. Mr. Frachiseur and I, and Mr. Matthews and Mr. Howen. Our job
here before you is complete. Innocent until proven guilty, yes. Today ends that
preposition. There is no innocence in this courtroom except the innocence of Mary
Severson. She didn’t have to die. The only reason she did was the lust and greed of
the defendant to get out of a marriage rather than divorce so he could get all the
money and then some; and he could pursue his other women, not this fat woman
that he saw in front of him who refused to give him the divorce.”
The district court analyzed this statement by breaking it down to its constituent parts. It found
several of them to constitute prosecutorial misconduct. R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, pp.857-58.
It is well settled: any issue before Idaho appellate courts not supported with argument and
authority will not be considered. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996). Appellate
counsel freely admitted he failed to support the statement with either argument or authority and,
more importantly, that he was familiar with Zichko at the time he worked on Mr. Severson’s direct
appeal. Tr. 45780-2018, p. 38, l. 10-p. 39, l. 6. Of course, the Severson I Court refused to consider
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the statement(s) not supported by argument or authority on direct appeal. Severson I, 147 Idaho at
719 n.33, 215 P.3d 439 n.33.
Again, the State appears to argue for a “results-oriented” analysis of the prejudice prong of
Strickland; a position that has been soundly rejected. Appellate counsel’s deficient performance in
the failure to support, with argument and authority, why certain statements by the State constituted
fundamental error, led to prejudice in Mr. Severson’s appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, as well as in Mr. Severson’s Opening Brief, the district
court’s Final Judgment, dismissing, with prejudice, all claims in the Third Amended Verified
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (On Remand) must be reversed and Mr. Severson awarded a
new trial.
There were multiple fundamental errors arising from prosecutorial misconduct during
closing argument. Trial counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s blatant trampling on Mr.
Severson’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and was constitutionally ineffective for failing
to do so. Mr. Severson suffered prejudice because of trial counsel’s deficient performance.
Additionally, Mr. Severson is entitled to a new trial by virtue of appellate counsel’s
ineffective assistance which resulted in prejudice in Mr. Severson’s appeal.
DATED this 21st day of January 2019.

Kormanik & Sneed LLP
/s/ John R. Kormanik
John R. Kormanik
Counsel for Larry M. Severson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
instrument was served upon the following by the method indicated:
Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
State of Idaho
Paul R. Panther
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Division

_____ Hand Delivered
_____ U.S. Mail
_____ Fax
_____ Email
__x__ ICourt Efile & Serve
_____Other: Attorney General’s mailbox at
the Idaho Supreme Court

Kenneth K. Jorgensen
Deputy Attorney General
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
ecf@ag.idaho.gov

DATED this 21st day of January 2019.

/s/ John R. Kormanik
for KORMANIK & SNEED LLP
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